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Abstract
This paper extends three decades of work arguing that researchers who discuss consciousness should
not restrict themselves only to (adult) human minds, but should study (and attempt to model) many
kinds of minds, natural and artiﬁcial, thereby contributing to our understanding of the space containing
all of them. We need to study what they do or can do, how they can do it, and how the natural ones
can be emulated in synthetic minds. That requires: (a) understanding sets of requirements that are met
by different sorts of minds, i.e. the niches that they occupy, (b) understanding the space of possible
designs, and (c) understanding complex and varied relationships between requirements and designs.
Attempts to model or explain any particular phenomenon, such as vision, emotion, learning, language
use, or consciousness lead to muddle and confusion unless they are placed in that broader context. A
methodology for making progress is summarised and a novel requirement proposed for a theory of
how human minds work: the theory should support a single generic design for a learning, developing
system that, in addition to meeting familiar requirements, should be capable of developing different and
opposed philosophical viewpoints about consciousness, and the so-called hard problem. In other words,
we need a common explanation for the mental machinations of mysterians, materialists, functionalists,
identity theorists, and those who regard all such theories as attempting to answer incoherent questions.
No designs proposed so far come close.
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1 Could We Be Discussing Bogus Concepts?
Many debates about consciousness appear to be endless because of conceptual confusions preventing clarity as to what
the issues are and what does or does not count as valid argument or progress in ﬁnding answers. Even attempts to
make the issues precise by introducing technical terms such as ‘phenomenal consciousness’ and ‘access consciousness’
simply lead to the new terms being used in different ways by different authors, most of whom assume that it is clear
what they mean.
1
This conceptual mess makes it hard to decide what should go into a machine if it is to be described as ‘conscious’, or
as ‘having qualia’. Triumphant demonstrations by some AI developers of machines with alleged competences (seeing,
having emotions, learning, being autonomous, being conscious, having qualia, etc.) are regarded by others as proving
nothing of interest because the systems do not satisfy their deﬁnitions or their requirements-speciﬁcations.
2
Moreover, alleged demonstrations of programs with philosophically problematic features such as free will, qualia,
or phenomenal consciousness, will be dismissed (a) by those researchers who deny that those phenomena can exist at
all, eveninhumans, (b)byotherswhoclaimthatthephenomenaaredeﬁnitionallyrelatedtobeingaproductofevolution
and, therefore, by deﬁnition, no artiﬁcial working model can be relevant, and (c) by various sets of researchers who
claim that only their own deﬁnitions of the key concepts are worthy of being used.
Most AI researchers who claim to be working on consciousness ignore the long philosophical history of debates on
whether there can be any such thing, or how to analyse the key terms, pay little or no attention to the myriad empirical
facts about what the members of many different animal species can do, do not consider a variety of alternative designs
1This is a slightly revised version of (Sloman, 2007) with a new title. After this had been accepted as a “target” article by
International Journal for Machine Consciousness, the commentaries made me realise that many assumptions had been made that were
either unclear or not widely accepted. So a background paper (Sloman, 2010) and online tutorial presentation (Sloman, 2009) are now
also available.
2Everyone who has not yet read the trenchant observations in (McDermott, 1981) about claims made by AI researchers should do
so now. The arguments apply not only to Symbolic AI, which was dominant at the time it was written, but to all approaches to AI.
2and compare their relevance as possible explanations, and simply assume that the deﬁnition they use for some key term
is the right one (often citing some authority such as a famous philosopher or psychologist to support that assumption,
as if academics in those ﬁelds all agreed on deﬁnitions). They then proceed to implement something which they believe
matches their deﬁnition.
One result is researchers talking past each other, unawares. In doing so they often re-invent ideas that have been
previously discussed at length by others, including theories that were refuted long ago! Boden’s recent historical survey
(2006) should help to reduce such ignorance, but a radical change in education in the ﬁeld is needed, to ensure that
researchers know a lot more about the history of the subject and don’t all write as if the history had started a decade
or two ago. (Many young AI researchers know only the literature recommended by their supervisors – because they
transferred at PhD level from some other discipline and had no time to learn more than the minimum required for
completing their thesis.)
Some of the diversity of assumptions regarding what ‘consciousness’ is and how ‘it’ should be explained can
be revealed by trawling through the archives of the psyche-d discussion forum: http://www.archive.org/
details/PSYCHE-Dstartingin1993, showinghowhighlyintelligent, andwelleducated, philosophersandscientists
talk past one another. A list of bizarrely diverse proposed deﬁnitions of “cognition” and a list of controversies in
cognitive systems research on the euCognition web site http://www.eucognition.org/wiki/ also helps to
indicate the diversity of views in this general area. Unfortunately many researchers are unaware that their assumptions
are controversial.
Some of the dangers and confusions in claims to have implemented some allegedly key notion of consciousness
were pointed out in (Sloman & Chrisley, 2003). For example, most people will say, if asked, that being asleep entails
being unconscious. Yet many of those people, if asked on another occasion whether having a frightening nightmare
involves being conscious, will answer ‘yes’: They believe you cannot be frightened of a lion chasing you without being
conscious. Sleepwalking provides another example. It seems to be obviously true (a) that a sleepwalker who gets
dressed, opens a shut door and then walks downstairs must have seen the clothes, the door-handle, and the treads on
the staircase, (b) that anyone who sees things in the environment must be conscious and (c) that sleepwalkers are, by
deﬁnition, asleep, and (d) that sleepwalkers are therefore unconscious. The lack of clarity in such concepts also emerges
in various debates that seem to be unresolvable, e.g. debates on: Which animals have phenomenal consciousness? At
what stage does a human foetus or infant begin to have it? Can you be conscious of something without being conscious
that you are conscious of it – if so is there an inﬁnite regress?
The existence of inconsistent or divergent intuitions suggests that the supposed common, intuitive notion of
consciousness is mythical, and that instead there is a family of different notions, with so many ﬂaws that none of
the common labels is ﬁt to be used in formulating scientiﬁc questions or engineering goals, since it will be impossible
to be clear whether the questions have been answered or whether the goals have been achieved. Attempts to avoid
this unclarity by introducing new, precise deﬁnitions, e.g. distinguishing ‘phenomenal’ from ‘access’ consciousness
as in (Block, 1995), or talking about ‘what it is like to be something’ (Nagel, 1981) all move within a circle of ill-
deﬁned notions, without clearly identifying some unique thing that has to be explained, nor with any argument that
convinces everyone that the notion in question is coherent, nor with any agreed speciﬁcation of what would count as
an explanation, as noted by (Nagel, 1998). Some of these points are made in the editor’s introduction to Journal of
Consciousness Studies Vol 14,9-10, 2007 (Gennaro, 2007).
For what it’s worth my own view is that the notion of “consciousness” is so ill-deﬁned (as claimed by Turing
regarding “intelligence” in his 1950 article) that there is no point even discussing it except to show why it is worthless
in scientiﬁc contexts, though the adjective “conscious” has many uses in ordinary conversation and medical contexts.
Moreover, someoftheattemptstomakeitmorepreciseoftenappeartodismantlesomanyofthenormalpresuppositions
of ordinary uses of words like ‘conscious’, ‘experience’, ‘mind’, that they end up incoherent despite using well-formed
linguistic expressions, like the notion of a machine that records the time at the centre of the earth.
2 How to make progress
If, instead of talking about this bogus thing called “consciousness”, we assemble all the known facts about competences,
both behavioural and mental, of humans and other animals (including infants, children, and adults, people with brain
damage, with physical deformities, or parts missing or damaged through injury or disease) and show how those
competences may coexist in demonstrable working models, and devise whatever tests we can to choose between
alternative such models as explanations of the human competences (using the neo-Popperian methodology of Imre
Lakatos (Lakatos, 1980) for evaluating rival explanations) then we shall have solved the only problems of consciousness
worth solving. If every other fact about human minds has been explained, then there will be nothing left to be explained
about human consciousness. (Compare (Sloman & Chrisley, 2003).) It is very important to note that I am not just
3talking about modelling or explaining observed behaviours. For example the ability to learn to think about numbers,
discussed in (Sloman, 1978, Chapter 8) and related competences described in (Sloman, 2008) are non-behavioural
competences that can have, but need not have, speciﬁc behavioural consequences.
The rest of this paper indicates some of the requirements for carrying out that research programme. This will
include indicating, at a very high level of abstraction, some of the biological facts to be explained, indicating how
unclear concepts of common sense (and of philosophy) could be replaced by more precise and varied architecture-
based concepts better suited to specify what needs to be explained by scientiﬁc theories. Finally a new (hard) test
for progress in this area is proposed, which could be seen as a massive extension of all versions of the Turing test so
far proposed, for it requires a common initial design to be able to explain developmental trajectories leading to very
different end results.
3 Understanding What Evolution Has Done
The inability of researchers to identify a single core concept to focus research on is not surprising, since natural minds
(biological control systems), and their varying forms of consciousness, are products of millions of years of evolution
in which myriad design options were explored, most of which are still not understood: we know only fragments of
what we are, and different researchers (psychologists, neuroscientists, linguists, sociologists, biologists, philosophers,
novelists, ...) know different fragments. They are like the proverbial blind men trying to say what an elephant is on the
basis of feeling different parts of an elephant.
3
What we introspect may be as primitive (naive) in relation to what is really going on in our minds (our virtual
machines, not our brains) as ancient perceptions of earth, air, ﬁre and water were in relation to understanding the
physical world. Neither the biological mechanisms that evolved for perceiving the physical environment nor those that
evolved for perceiving what is going on in ourselves were designed to serve the purposes of scientiﬁc theorising and
explaining, but rather to meet the requirements of everyday decision making, online control, and learning, although as
the ‘everyday’ activities become more complex, more varied, and their goals more precise, those activities develop into
the activities of science partly by revealing the need to extend our ontologies.
Some will object that introspective beliefs are necessarily true, because you cannot be mistaken about how things
seem to you (which is why they are sometimes thought to provide the foundations of all other knowledge). To cut a
long story short, the incorrigibility of what you think you know or sense or remember or how things seem to you is
essentially a tautology with no consequences, like the tautology that no measuring instrument can give an incorrect
reading of what its reading is. The voltmeter can get the voltage wrong but it can’t be wrong about what it measures the
voltage to be. No great metaphysical truths ﬂow from that triviality.
People who are puzzled about what consciousness is, what mechanisms make it possible, how it evolved, whether
machines can have it, etc., can make progress if they replace questions referring to ‘it’ with a whole battery of questions
referring to different capabilities that can occur in animals and machines with different designs. The result need not
be some new deep concept corresponding to our pre-scientiﬁc notion of consciousness. It is more likely that we shall
progress beyond thinking there is one important phenomenon to be explained.
What needs to be explained is rarely evident at the start of a scientiﬁc investigation: it becomes clear only in the
process of developing new concepts and explanatory theories, and developing new ways to check the implications of
proposed theories. We did not know what electromagnetic phenomena were and then ﬁnd explanatory theories: rather,
the development of new theories and techniques led to new knowledge of what those theories were required to explain,
as well as the development of new concepts to express both the empirical observations and the explanatory theories,
and our growing ability to perform tests to check the predictions of the theories (Cohen, 1962). We now know of
many more phenomena involving energy that need to be explained by theories of transformation and transmission of
energy than were known to Newton. Likewise, new phenomena relating to consciousness also emerge from studies of
hypnosis, drugs of various kinds, anaesthetic procedures, brain damage, the developing minds of young children, and
studies of cognition in non-human animals. Different sorts of consciousness may be possible in a bacterium, a bee, a
boa constrictor, a baboon, a human baby, a baseball fan, brain-damaged humans, and, of course, various kinds of robots.
Instead of one key kind of ‘natural’ consciousness that needs to be explained, there are very many complete designs
each of which resulted from very many evolutionary design choices, and in some cases a combination of evolutionary
decisions and developmental options (i.e. epigenesis – see Jablonka and Lamb (2005) ). For example, what a human
can be aware of soon after birth is not the same as what it can be aware of one, ﬁve, ten or ﬁfty years later. Likewise,
the consequences of awareness change.
3Read the poem by John Godfrey Saxe here:
http://www.wordinfo.info/words/index/info/view unit/1
44 Adopting the Design Stance
Although AI researchers attempting to study consciousness start from different, and often inconsistent, facets of a very
complex collection of natural phenomena, they do try to adopt the design stance (Dennett, 1978), which, in principle
can lead to new insights and new clarity. This involves specifying various functional designs for animals and robots and
trying to deﬁne the states and processes of interest in terms of what sorts of things can happen when instances of such
designs are working. Compare: different sorts of deadlock, or different sorts of external attack, can arise in different
sorts of computer operating systems.
4 The use of the design stance to clarify the notion of free will is illustrated in
(Sloman, 1992; Franklin, 1995). The task is more complex for notions related to consciousness.
But there are serious obstacles. In order to make progress, we require, but currently lack, a good set of concepts
for describing and comparing different sets of requirements and different designs: we need ontologies for requirements
and designs and for describing relations between requirements and designs when both are complex. Without such a
conceptual framework we cannot expect to cope with the complex variety of biological designs and the even larger,
because less constrained, space of possible artiﬁcial designs. Unfortunately, as shown below, different terms are used
by different researchers to describe architectures, capabilities, and mechanisms, and often the same word is used with
different interpretations.
5 Don’t All Running Programs Introspect?
McCarthy (1995) and Sloman (1978, ch 6) present reasons why various kinds of self-knowledge could be useful in a
robot, but specifying a working design is another matter. Is there a clear distinction between systems with and without
self-knowledge? The informalnotion ofself-awareness orself-consciousnessis basedon aproduct ofevolution, namely
the ability to introspect, which obviously exists in adult humans, and may exist in infants and in some other animals.
How it develops in humans is not clear.
Normal adult humans can notice and reﬂect on some of the contents of their own minds, for instance when they
answer questions during an oculist’s examination, or when they report that they are bored, or hungry, or unable to tell the
difference between two coloured patches, or that they did not realise they were angry. Some consciousness researchers
attempt to focus only on verbal reports or other explicit behaviours indicating the contents of consciousness, but hardly
anyone nowadays thinks the label “consciousness” refers to such behaviours. Many (though not all) would agree that
what you are conscious of when looking at swirling rapids or trees waving in the breeze cannot be fully reported in
available verbal or non-verbal behaviours. Available motor channels do not have sufﬁcient bandwidth for that task. So
most researchers have to fall back, whether explicitly or unwittingly, on results of their own introspection to identify
what they are talking about.
We designers do not have that limitation, since we can derive theories about unobservable processes going on inside
complex virtual machines from the way they have been designed. The design stance naturally leads to speciﬁcations
that refer to internal mechanisms, states and processes (in virtual machines
5) that are not necessarily identiﬁable on the
basis of externally observable behaviours.
From the design standpoint, what ‘introspect’ means has to be speciﬁed in the context of a general ontology for
describing architectures for organisms and robots: something we lack at present. Many simple designs can be described
as having simple forms of introspection, including systems with feedback control loops such as those presented in
(Braitenberg, 1984). Many simple control mechanisms compare signals and expectations and modify actions on the
basis of that comparison. If learning is included, more permanent modiﬁcations result. Those mechanisms all include
primitive sorts of introspection. AI problem-solvers, planners, and theorem-provers need to be able to tell whether they
have reached a goal state, and if not what possible internal actions are relevant to the current incomplete solution so
that one or more of them can be selected to expand the search for a complete solution. Pattern driven rule-systems
need information about which rules are applicable at any time and which bindings are possible for the variables in the
rule-patterns. Even a simple conditional test in a program which checks whether the values in two registers are the
same could be said to use introspection. And inputs to synapses in neural nets provide information about the states of
other neurons.
So any such system that goes beyond performing a rigidly pre-ordained sequence of actions must use introspection,
and to that extent is self-conscious. That would make all non-trivial computer programs and all biological organisms
self-conscious.
4I call this a study of logical topography. Several logical geographies may be consistent with one logical topography. See
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/logical-geography.html
5For a presentation on the relevance of the notion of ‘virtual machine’ (not to be confused with ‘virtual reality’), see http:
//www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#cons09
5Clearly that is not what most designers mean by ‘introspection’ and ‘self-conscious’. Why not? The examples
given use only transient self-information. After a decision has been reached or a selection made the information used
is no longer available. Enduring, explicit, information is required if comparisons are to be made about what happens in
the system at different times.
Moreover, the examples all involve very ‘low-level’ particles of information. For a system to know that it is working
on a difﬁcult problem, that its current reasoning processes or perceptual states are very different from past examples,
or that it has not come closer to solving its problem, it would need ways of combining lots of detailed information
and producing summary ‘high-level’ descriptions, using a meta-semantic ontology, that can be stored and re-used for
different purposes. If it also needs to realise that something new has come up that is potentially more important than
the task it is currently engaged in, it will need to be able to do different things concurrently, for instance performing
one task while monitoring that process and comparing it with other processes. (Some examples relevant to learning to
use numbers were given in chapter 8 of Sloman, 1978).
So non-trivial introspection involves: An architecture with self-observation subsystems running concurrently with
others and using a meta-semantic ontology that refers to relatively high level (e.g. representational) states, events
and processes in the system, expressed in enduring multi-purpose forms of representation, as opposed to transient,
low-level contents of conditionals and selection procedures.
6 Additional requirements can be added to provide more
sophistication, including various forms of learning (e.g. introspective, meta-semantic, ontology extension), and self-
control mechanisms described below.
Non-trivial introspection goes beyond what is required for perceiving and acting in the world, and even what
is required for formulating and testing theories, making predictions, making plans and executing plans. The latter are
oftenimplementedinacollectionofreactiveanddeliberativemechanisms, withoutanyconcurrentlyactiveintrospective
mechanisms, in typical AI robots – which do many things but lack human-like self-awareness. An early exception was
the HACKER program described in (Sussman, 1975). But most of what I have read in recent years about machine
consciousness ignores all earlier work and attempts to start from scratch.
6 Muddled Reactions and Deliberations
It is perhaps not surprising that there is confusion about notions as complex and multi-faceted as ‘introspection’,
‘emotion’, ‘belief’, ‘motivation’, ‘learning’, and ‘understanding’. Unfortunately there is also confusion over terms
used to describe much simpler architectures, meeting simpler requirements.
What ‘reactive’ means, for example, varies from one researcher to another, some of whom restrict it to stateless
architectures. That would make reactive architectures of little interest, since stateless systems are incapable of any
learning, changing goals or needs, or other features of even the simplest organisms. Other authors allow ‘reactive’ to
refer to mechanisms that can sense both external and internal states and produce both external and internal changes, but
restrict the word to systems that cannot represent possible future or past situations that are not sensed, or sequences of
possible actions. Examples include behaviour-based robots, systems running feed-forward neural nets, and Nilsson’s
teleoreactive goal achievers (Nilsson, 1994). The vast majority of biological organisms have only reactive mechanisms
in that sense. However, there are still very rich possibilities within that framework, though not everyone appreciates
them. I was surprised to read in a recent collection on artiﬁcial consciousness that whereas a purely reactive robot can
continue moving towards a visible target it would be helpless if an obstacle got in the way – surprised because for many
years I have been teaching students how purely reactive robots can go round obstacles.
7
Reactive systems can even deal with goal conﬂicts: Proto-deliberative systems (Sloman & Chrisley, 2005;
Sloman, Chrisley, & Scheutz, 2005) are a special subset of reactive systems in which a pattern of sensory states can
simultaneously trigger two or more internal or external responses, where some competitive mechanism selects between
them – e.g. using winner-takes-all to select between ﬁghting and ﬂeeing in response to a threat. Such things are
probably common in insects as well as many vertebrate species.
However, purely reactive systems cannot meet the requirements for ‘fully deliberative’ systems which have the
ability to represent, compare, describe differences between, and choose between sequences of possible actions, or
explanatory hypotheses, or predictions – all with variable structures. These require special architectural support for
construction, manipulation, analysis and comparison of “hypothetical” representations of varying complexity that are
not simply triggered by internal or external sensors and may be selected only after complex comparisons, and then
possibly stored for various future uses.
8
6The enduring information can be about transient events.
7Illustrated in some movies of SimAgent demos here: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/
poplog/figs/simagent
8Fully deliberative systems and a collection of intermediate cases are described in a still unpublished online working document:
6There are many intermediate cases between reactive systems and fully deliberative systems, though it is worth
noting that all those mechanisms have to be implemented in reactive systems.
9 Unfortunately, the word ‘deliberative’ is
another that has not been used consistently in the research community. For instance, some people use the label for what
we called ‘proto-deliberative’ systems above, which includes simple organisms that select between options activated in
a neural net. Lumping proto-deliberative systems together with systems that can search in a space of newly constructed
reusable possible plans or hypotheses obscures important differences in requirements and designs. See footnote 8.
7 Varieties of Perception and Action
Many AI architectural diagrams show a complex cognitive system with a small input box labelled ‘perception’ or
‘sensors’ and a small output box labelled ‘action’ or ‘effectors’, suggesting that there are simple “peephole” channels
for input and output. This ignores the richness and complexity of perception and action capabilities in humans (and
probably many other animals) and the variety of links between those capabilities and central capabilities. Anyone
who works on reading text or understanding speech will know that several levels of abstraction need to be processed
concurrently. Likewise speaking, typing, or performing music requires multiple levels of control of output. Similar
comments apply to many forms of perception and action, requiring what I have called “multi-window” designs for both
(e.g. Sloman & Chrisley (2003, 2005)), in contrast with “peephole” perception and action.
Thefullimplicationsofthisaretoocomplextobediscussedhere, butitisworthmentioningthatiftherearemultiple
concurrent levels of perceptual processing and multiple concurrent levels of control of actions, then that increases the
variety of possible contents for self-monitoring. Architectures can vary according to which sub-processes are accessible
to introspection. Self-modifying architectures may allow self-monitoring and self-control capabilities to be extended
by training (including artistic training, or use of bio-feedback).
For a philosophical robot to start thinking about the phenomenal contents of experience, or ‘qualia’, its introspective
mechanisms would need to be able to access and record the contents of at least some of the perceptual processing
subsystems. Different access routes and different internal forms of representation and introspective ontologies would
be needed for noticing that you are looking at a river from above, and for noticing the constantly changing details of
the swirling rapids. Experiencing the fact that you are seeing a red patch is much less interesting, but also requires
introspective access to perceptual sub-processes.
In (Sloman & Chrisley, 2003) it was argued that a machine with such capabilities (e.g. implemented using the H-
CogAff architecture – see Fig. 1) could use self-organising classiﬁcation mechanisms to develop ontologies for referring
to its own perceptual contents and other internal states. That ontology would be inherently private and incommunicable,
because of the role of “causal indexicality” in determining the semantics of the labels used. This explains some of the
features of qualia that have led to philosophical puzzles and disputes.
8 Architectures With Metamanagement
A complex control system can include many reactive and deliberative mechanisms, including feedback control and
learning, without having the introspective capabilities described earlier. Systems with the additional self-monitoring
capabilities are sometimes described as ‘reﬂective’ or ‘self-reﬂective’, since some people allow ‘reﬂective’ to describe
the ability to monitor actions in the environment and learn from mistakes, etc. (e.g. in Minsky 2006).
Monitoring can be a purely passive process, whereas it is often important to intervene as a result of monitoring.
Various kinds of intervention are possible, including speeding up, slowing down, aborting, suspending, modulating,
changing priorities, shifting attention, combining actions, and many more. The label ‘metamanagement’ (Beaudoin,
1994) refers to the combination of introspection and active control based on self-monitoring. A system with
metamanagement abilities not only senses and records internal happenings, but can also use that information in
controlling or modulating the processes monitored and may even use fully deliberative resources in doing so (see
footnote 8).
However it is not possible for everything to be monitored and controlled, since that would produce an inﬁnite
regress, as discussed in (Minsky, 1968), but some subset can be, including the subset discussed in (McCarthy, 1995).
What is theoretically possible, and which requirements are met by various possible designs, are open theoretical
questions; while what sorts of introspective and self-controlling, i.e. metamanagement, capabilities exist in various
Requirements for a Fully Deliberative Architecture
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cosy/papers/#dp0604
9These and related distinctions are presented and discussed in (Sloman, 1978, 1993; Beaudoin, 1994; Wright, Sloman, & Beaudoin,
1996; Sloman, 1997, 2002b, 2002a; Sloman & Chrisley, 2005; Sloman et al., 2005; Minsky, 2006)
7Figure 1: Sketch of the H-CogAff architecture showing reactive, deliberative and metamanagement layers,
with multi-window perception and action, alarms, and personae. Far more arrows are needed than are
shown! So far only parts of this have been implemented.
biological organisms are open empirical questions. We have identiﬁed a need for a special subset of such mechanisms
tofunctionastrainable“alarm”mechanisms(Sloman&Logan, 1999), closelyassociatedwithcertainsortsofemotional
processes. It is also arguable that metamanagement subsystems may need different monitoring and control regimes for
use in different contexts, as humans seem to do: we could call those different “personae”, as indicated crudely in
Figure 1. Until we know a lot more both about what is theoretically possible and what actually exists, and what the
design-tradeoffs are between different possibilities, we can expect discussions of consciousness to remain muddled.
9 Studying One Thing or Many Things
If there is no unique notion identiﬁed by the label ‘consciousness’, then perhaps in connection with different sorts of
organisms and machines the label refers to different complex collections of capabilities.
Suppose we temporarily drop that label and specify every other feature of human mentality, including abilities to
perceive, remember, notice, forget, focus attention on, shift attention from, reason, plan, execute a plan, reconsider a
decision, modify an action, and many affective abilities, such as abilities to have different sorts of desires, inclinations,
and preferences, including wanting some states to continue and others to end, and some to begin, and so on. If we can
obtain a very detailed set of speciﬁcations for everything but consciousness, and use those speciﬁcations to produce a
working design for a system like a human being in all those respects, including being capable of having all the same
dispositional states: not only dispositions to produce externally visible behaviour, but also dispositions to think, want,
like dislike, remember, etc., it is not clear what might be left out that could be added that would make any difference to
anything.
Some people think that implies that consciousness (or phenomenal consciousness) is an epiphenomenon: other
things can produce and modify it but it has no effects. An alternative is that the notion of consciousness (or qualia) that
leads to that conclusion is an incoherent notion – like the notion of the speed at which the whole universe is moving
left, without that motion being detectable because all measuring devices that can detect motion are also moving at the
same speed in the same direction.
If every other aspect of human mentality can be speciﬁed in great detail and emulated in a working system, and
if it can be shown what difference different designs occurring in nature or in artifacts make, not just to observable
behaviours, but to modes of processing, to energy or other requirements, and to readiness for contingencies that may
never occur but would need to be dealt with if they did occur, then all substantive questions about consciousness
and other aspects of mind will have been answered, whether philosophers agree or not. (Of course, those driven
by fundamentalist religious concerns or a romantic opposition to scientiﬁc understanding of human minds cannot be
8expected to agree: they do not engage in the pursuit of scientiﬁc knowledge.)
10 Factional Disputes
In a more complete discussion it would be of interest to analyse the relationships between different approaches to
consciousness and different factions that have arisen in the 50 year history of AI. We can expect to ﬁnd different designs
produced by: those working with symbolic AI systems, using logic or symbolic rules; connectionists using neural nets;
researchers on dynamical systems; those working with behaviour based systems; those who have been convinced that
physical embodiment is essential; those happy to explore virtual robots interacting with other things in virtual worlds;
those dealing only with internet agents, such as trading agents which may become conscious of investments losing
value leading to anxiety or fear, and so on.
All these factions seem to me to suffer from a narrowness of vision arising out of conceptual confusions. For
example, the current emphasis on the importance of embodiment shifts between tautological triviality (you cannot have
perception and action in our physical environment without having a body with sensors and effectors, and the nature of
the sensors and effectors will partially determine what an embodied agent can learn about and do in the world), and
plain falsehood (an architecture with many of the features of mind that are important for humans cannot be implemented
unless it is constantly interacting with the physical and social environment through physical sensors and effectors).
In the past I have explored the idea of a disembodied mathematician concerned only with ﬁnding interesting,
new, increasingly complex mathematical conjectures, seeking proofs or refutations, trying to improve on old proofs,
becoming excited when a problem looks close to being solved, anxious when a proof begins to look ﬂawed, relieved
when the ﬂaw is removed, delighted when a very hard problem is ﬁnally solved, and so on. Of course, this upsets
people from many other factions, but I see nothing inconsistent in the possibility of such a disembodied system. (For
a week or two when I was an undergraduate I nearly became such a system while I was spending most of my time
lying on my back with my eyes shut trying to prove a theorem I had read about when studying set theory, the Cantor-
Bernstein-Schroeder theorem.)
10 A disembodied artiﬁcial mathematician of that sort might never experience colours,
toothache, the effort in walking uphill, the resistance to pushing a large object, and so on, but it would experience
equations, geometric and other structures, a proof being nearly complete, and so on. On completing a proof, or ﬁnding
a ﬂaw in a previously completed proof, it might have all the non-physical states and processes (including dispositional
states in its virtual machine) that are found in the joy or irritation of a human mathematician. Of course, without a body
it will not have any feelings in its stomach, tingling of its skin, inclinations to jump for joy. But those are unnecessary
for the emotions associated with doing mathematics. (At least they were not necessary for my experiences. You may
be different.)
Would such a mathematician have consciousness, emotions, goals, or beliefs? We can avoid futile and interminable
debates based on muddled concepts by adopting the design stance and specifying types of consciousness that are
available to a disembodied system with a suitably rich virtual machine architecture: e.g. this design is capable of having
consciousness of types C88 and C93 and emotions of types E22 and E33. Such proposals will be countered by dogmatic
assertions that without full embodiment the mathematician will not have real desires, plans, beliefs, consciousness,
emotions, etc. Compare denying that a circle is a ”real” ellipse.
11 Shifting the Terms of the Dispute
We can shift the debate about requirements for consciousness in a fruitful way by focusing on phenomena that everyone
must agree do exist. For example all disputants must agree that there are people from various cultures who, possibly for
multiple and diverse reasons, are convinced that there is something to be discussed and explained, variously labelled
‘phenomenal consciousness’, ‘qualia’, ‘raw feels’, ‘what it is like to be something’, etc. though they may disagree
on some details, such as whether these are epiphenomenal (i.e. incapable of being causes), whether their nature can
be described in a public language, whether they can exist in non-biological machines, whether they have biological
functions, whether other animals have them, how they evolved, whether it is possible to know whether anyone other
than yourself has them, etc. Likewise everyone who enters into debates about the truth of such convictions must agree
that there are others who strongly disagree with those opinions.
These disputes involving highly intelligent people on both sides clearly exist, and people on both sides acknowledge
their existence by taking part in the disputes. So that is something that needs to be explained. Even people who dispute
the need for a scientiﬁc explanation of qualia (e.g. because they claim the concept is incoherent) must agree on the need
to explain the existence of disputes about qualia. So people on both sides of such disputes must agree that an adequate
10Described in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cantor-Bernstein-Schroeder theorem
9implementable theory of how typical (adult) human minds work should explain the possibility of views being held on
both (or all) sides of such disputes.
12 A New “Turing Test”: for a Robot Philosopher
The ability of one design to produce robots that favour one or other side in such a philosophical dispute about
consciousness should not arise from addition of some otherwise unnecessary feature to the design: it should arise out
of design features that have biological or engineering advantages (at least for some species of animal or machine)
independently of modelling or explaining these philosophical tendencies. Moreover, the same design features,
presumably common to all human minds, should explain the possibility of an intelligent robot becoming a supporter of
any of the views encountered in disputes about consciousness.
To produce a design suited to this test we need to start by considering only functionally useful architectural
requirements for the design of an animal or machine with a wide range of information-processing capabilities, such as
humans have, all of which are capable of producing some useful effects, which might help to explain how they evolved.
This could include having an architecture that provides metamanagement mechanisms for internal self-monitoring and
self control, as already described. The detailed speciﬁcation can be left as a task for designers wishing to show that
their robot can pass the robot philosopher test.
To pass the test such a design should enable a robot to notice facts about itself that are naturally described in ways
that we ﬁnd in philosophers who wish to talk about qualia, phenomenal consciousness, raw feels, etc. The very same
basic design must also explain why such a robot after studying philosophy, or physics or psychology should also be
capable of becoming convinced that talk about qualia, etc. is misguided nonsense. E.g. we should be able to use the
same design to model both people like Thomas Nagel, or David Chalmers (Chalmers, 1996), and people like Daniel
Dennett or Gilbert Ryle (Ryle, 1949). Perhaps such a robot should be capable of reaching the conclusions presented in
this paper and proposing this robot turing test.
The functioning model would show how individuals starting with the same sort of genetic makeup can develop
in different ways as regards their standards of meaningfulness, or their standards of evidence for theories. Or more
subtly, they may develop different ontologies for describing the same portion of reality (as humans often do). In such
a situation we may be able to explain what is correct and what is incorrect about the assertions made on both sides,
for instance, if the contradictions in their descriptions of the same phenomena arise out of incomplete understanding of
what is going on. Ideally we should be able to provide a deep new theory that incorporates what is correct in both sides
and exposes the errors made by both sides.
13 Generalising Bifurcation Requirements
Perhaps a theory of this sort could deal in the same way not merely with disputes about consciousness, but also disputes
about free-will, about the nature of affective states and processes, about the existence of ‘a self’, and about the nature
of causation. The design should allow some robot philosophers to become convinced that physical embodiment is
essential for mentality, while others argue that purely disembodied intelligences are perfectly possible (as long as
physical machines are available on which to implement the required virtual machines). Some should reach Hume’s
views about causation being nothing more than constant conjunction, while others end up agreeing with Kant that there
is something more.
Producing a theory about a design that allows for various bifurcations regarding a host of philosophical problems
will require us to answer many questions about how normal, adult, human minds work. It is likely that any such theory
will also provide a basis for modelling novel kinds of minds by modifying some of the requirements and showing which
designs would then sufﬁce, or by showing how various kinds of damage or genetic malfunction could produce known
kinds of human abnormality, and perhaps predict the possibility of types of minds and types of abnormality in human
minds that are not yet known.
This work has already begun. As reported above, in (Sloman and Chrisley 2003) a partial speciﬁcation was given
for a machine whose normal functioning could lead it to discover within itself something like what philosophers have
called ‘qualia’ as a result of developing an ontology for describing its sensory contents. Further development of the
design may help to resolve questions that currently hinder progress in both AI and philosophy.
The design and implementation of such machines, and analyses of their tradeoffs, could help to unify philosophy,
psychology, psychiatry, neuroscience, studies of animal cognition, and of course AI and robotics.
1014 Finally: Major Omissions
There are many things that have not been mentioned here or which require far more detailed discussion. I have assumed
that the architectures under discussion will include many affective states and processes, arising from mechanisms for
generating new goals, preferences, ideals, likes, dislikes, etc., mechanisms for resolving conﬂicts, and mechanisms for
learning new ways of doing all those things. The previously mentioned “alarm” mechanisms are a special case. These
topics have been discussed in more detail elsewhere, especially Simon’s seminal (Simon, 1967) and also (Sloman,
1978, 1993; Beaudoin, 1994; Wright et al., 1996; Sloman, 1997, 2002b, 2002a; Sloman & Chrisley, 2005; Sloman
et al., 2005; Minsky, 2006), and in the writings of many other authors. However much work remains to be done on
requirements for motivational and related mechanisms. Without that the goals of this discussion cannot be achieved.
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